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This study addresses the question of why some countries import more R&D- 
intensive goods than others. Using a panel data set of 80 countries for the 
period 1970 to 1995, results indicate that domestic investment, FDI and the 
quality of intellectual property rights (IPR) systems positively affect technology 
imports. However, the higher the percentage of the workforce with primary 
studies, the lower technology imports are. Moreover, IPRs tend to reinforce the 
positive role played by FDI in importing technology while the ability of 







JEL Classifications: F10, F13, O33, O34 
Keywords: R&D, technology diffusion, absorptive capacity, complementarities, intellectual property 




                                                 
√  Department of Applied Economics, University of the Balearic Islands, Ctra de Valldemossa km 
7,5, 07122 Palma de Mallorca, Spain. Tel.: +34-971-172-784; fax: +34-971-172-389; e-mail: 
joseluis.groizard@uib.es.   1
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Differences in technology levels account for a major portion of cross-country income 
and growth disparities (Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare, 1997; Hall and Jones, 1999; 
Caselli, 2005). While industrialized economies have the advantage in terms of 
innovation, the majority of the world, which operates below the technological frontier, 
adopts technology developed by other countries (Evenson and Westphal, 1995). This 
fact brings to backward economies an important advantage because the imitation and 
adaptation of new technologies is less expensive and risky than creating them 
(Gerschenkron, 1962). Importing foreign technology is, then, a mechanism with 
which to increase growth and reduce the income gap across countries.  
Technology crosses borders via a variety of formal and informal channels, 
such as contracts for technology transfer, trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), the 
migration of skilled labour and imitation. A significant amount of recent evidence has 
supported the idea that trade is an important channel in technology diffusion both 
among developed countries (Coe and Helpman, 1995) and between developed and 
developing countries (Coe et al., 1997) and among the different potential channels, 
trade is perhaps the most consistent one (Keller, 2004).  
The factors that influence technology diffusion through trade are less 
straightforward. For instance, there are several studies showing that stronger 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) encourage trade (e.g. Maskus and Penubarti, 1995 
and Falvey et al., 2006), but there is no clear evidence that IPRs encourage 
technology imports. Additionally, human capital, domestic investment or openness 
are somehow perceived in the literature as factors enhancing technology diffusion; 
however, evidence on their respective contributions is scarce.   2
This study investigates the determinants of technology imports in a cross-
section of 80 countries between 1970 and 1995, using panel data techniques. Our goal 
is to investigate the precise role played by different factors that exert a potential 
influence on technology imports at country level. Our dependent variable is, therefore, 
imports of R&D-intensive goods exported by technological leaders as a proxy of 
investment in embodied technologies, following previous works (Eaton and Kortum, 
2001; Caselli and Wilson, 2004). Results suggest that domestic and foreign 
investment positively influence high-tech imports. Moreover, importer countries may 
increase technology inflows, improving the quality of IPR systems. Other factors 
exert a less robust role, such as trade openness or government expenditure. In 
contrast, countries with a human capital base strongly skewed towards unskilled 
workers import less technology from abroad. Finally, IPRs interact with FDI and 
human capital, suggesting that the role of FDI in fostering technology imports is 
higher the larger the protection of IPRs; meanwhile, the role of human capital reduces 
technology imports, the larger the protection of IPR. 
The study is organized as follows. The second section reviews the theoretical 
and empirical literature on the determinants of technology imports. The third section 
examines the technology gap and describes the data used to test the main hypothesis. 
The fourth section presents the model, the estimation techniques and discusses the 
results. Finally, section five summarizes the main conclusions of the study. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Trade enhances the international transmission of knowledge taking place either thanks 
to the direct trade of embodied technologies, which usually require licensing, or 
thanks to the involuntary exchange of information among local and foreign suppliers   3
and clients (Grossman and Helpman, 1991). In the first case, firms improve their 
technologies by using market mechanisms adopting state-of-the-art production 
processes or inputs already existing in other countries. In the second case, firms more 
open to foreign markets are more exposed to the public knowledge about new 
processes or new products that can lead to the adoption of new technologies for the 
local market. There is some cross-country evidence showing that openness to trade is 
correlated with certain measures of technology adoption, such as changes in total 
factor productivity (Coe and Helpman, 1995; Coe et al., 1997), larger investment in 
computers (Caselli and Coleman, 2001) or rates of adoption of specific innovations 
(Comin and Hobijn, 2004). A general weakness of this literature is that there is no 
distinction between the two types of trade influence. 
Neoclassical theory neglects the idea that countries tend to import more of 
those goods for which the agents have a special advantage in using them more 
efficiently. Surprisingly, there is a lack of theoretical literature concerning the specific 
determinants of technology imports. The only two exceptions are Eaton and Kortum 
(2001) and Caselli and Wilson (2004). The former proposes a comparative advantage 
model with heterogeneous capital goods, in which imports of capital goods (as a share 
of GDP) depend on investment rate and trade cost parameters that capture home bias 
and other geographic factors.
1 The latter proposes a model of investment based on 
heterogeneous forms of capital, suggesting that shares in different types of capital 
goods in investment depend on their intrinsic efficiency (embodied technology) and 
how much they are complementary to other inputs, the abundance of which may vary 
across countries.  
On the other hand, the literature on technology diffusion points out that 
technology is specific to a particular combination of inputs (Atkinson and Stiglitz,   4
1969; Basu and Weil, 1998), making its adoption more difficult, even with non-
existent adoption costs. Human capital is one of the most important factors likely to 
restrict imports of R&D-intensive goods, because the implementation of foreign 
technology might require skills and capabilities that are embodied in workers. Other 
studies emphasize that technology developed in advanced countries is more likely to 
be skill-biased (Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001), and, consequently, technology 
adoption and human capital specific investment need to be undertaken 
simultaneously.  
Empirical studies on the role of complementarities in trade are scant, but there 
is a long tradition of papers emphasizing the role of absorptive capacity in technology 
adoption. Several cross-country studies have detected that human capital plays a 
positive role in a country’s absorptive capacity (Caselli and Coleman, 2001; Keller, 
2004).  
There are potentially other complementary factors that are provided by the 
government. The transfer of embodied technologies very often entails the signature of 
licensing agreements where detailed conditions for the purchase of production, 
distribution rights, lending of technical assistance or training programmes for 
specialized personnel are established. Some studies find that a country’s institutions 
may ease the reluctance to sign contracts of technology transfer or may restrict the 
novelty of the knowledge to be transferred. For instance, Maskus and Penubarti 
(1995) find that intellectual property rights restrict trade directly, but also according to 
the imitative ability of the importing country, and Saggi (2002) emphasizes that when 
foreign firms do not license technology because of the weakness of the institutional 
framework, they prefer to transfer older technologies.    5
Multinational firms (MNEs) are seen as a vehicle of technology transfer. The 
literature also highlights that the transfer of technology might follow an internal 
transaction among parents and affiliates, and similarly to the trade channel, either a 
transaction through markets with local firms, or a spillover. Institutions that protect 
intellectual property are also conditioning the amount and the novelty of technology 
transferred internally or by the market mechanism. For instance, there is evidence that 
higher expropriation risk is associated with a smaller amount and older technologies 
transferred from parents to affiliates (Javorcik, 2006) and that lower quality of 
intellectual property rights reduce the transfer from multinational parents (Branstetter 
et al., 2006).  
On the other hand, the empirical evidence provided by Caselli and Wilson 
(2004) suggests that imports of equipment are positively related to the R&D content 
of imports interacting with a time trend, outward FDI, remoteness and property rights. 
However, no clear evidence has been found indicating any influence of human capital 
levels or intellectual property rights. However, a negative and robust inward FDI 
effect has been found, suggesting that FDI flows skew the composition of capital 
stock towards low-tech equipment. By looking at different types of capital goods, 
Caselli and Coleman (2001) found that imports of computers increase according to 
human capital stock size and the level of openness to trade, suggesting that 
technological spillovers are transmitted through trade.  
In summary, the ambiguity that arises in the literature concerning the role 
played by openness, domestic and foreign investment, IPR and human capital in the 
process of importing technology has driven this research.    6
III.  DATA AND MEASUREMENT 
A fundamental question approached in this study is how to measure technology trade. 
Technology is defined as the quality of capital and intermediate goods used in the 
production process at any given time. To our knowledge, there is no international data 
on disaggregate production or investment for a large number of countries and periods 
and no index to compare capital quality across countries.
2 However, ‘trade and 
productivity growth’ literature has shed some useful light on the identification and 
measurement of the relevant channels through which technology diffuses thanks to 
trade. For instance, Coe et al. (1997) find evidence of technological spillovers, 
showing that countries derive important benefits in terms of five-year productivity 
growth when importing machinery and equipment from R&D-performing economies, 
and that those benefits are lower when using imports of total manufactured goods or 
other aggregates. On the other hand, in growth models where technological progress 
arises in new vintages of capital goods, imports of capital goods entail an increase in 
the capital goods’ efficiency.
3  
To be closely related to the theory and evidence on the role of trade in 
technology diffusion, the measurement has focused on the trade flows of R&D-
intensive goods, broadly speaking consisting of machinery, instruments and fine 
chemical products.
4 One advantage of this definition of technology is that, while the 
production of machinery and instruments is highly concentrated in a few countries, as 
Eaton and Kortum (2001) have shown, the imports of R&D-intensive goods emerge 
as a reasonable proxy for technology adoption investment in countries with virtually 
no high-tech sectors.  
Since there are no available data to depict the production of technology across 
countries, we rely on trade data to infer which economies tend to produce and, as a   7
consequence, to export high-tech products. The theory suggests that a country with 
comparative advantage in the production of knowledge-intensive goods should show a 
significant presence of such products in the trade pattern. For this purpose, we employ 
the revealed comparative advantage index (RCA) in product i and country j, described 
by the following expression: 
(1)  RCAij=
X ij/∑ X ij
∑ X ij/∑∑X ij
 
where  X ij  is the value of R&D-intensive exports (in US dollars) in country j at a 
given time. A value of 1.1 shows that country j’s technology exports relative to its 
total exports are 10 per cent higher than the share of world technology exports relative 
to total world exports. Hence, an RCA index above one for a country can be 
interpreted as a technological advantage and, conversely, an RCA below one can be 
interpreted as a technological disadvantage. 
  Figure 1 shows the worldwide technological gap among country groups and a 
significant change in the export pattern since there have been data available.
5 In 1965, 
eight countries had an RCA index higher than one: Germany, Finland, France, Japan, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the USA.
6 The RCA difference 
interpreted as an index of technology gap shows a huge gap between the top eight 
R&D providers and the developing economies. However, that difference has 
shortened significantly in 1995 as a manifestation of technological catch-up in a 
relatively short period of time. Furthermore, the data reveals a technology gap 
between technological leaders and OECD economies,
7 which has also reduced in 
relative terms. During these years, the highest ability to export technology to world 
markets has been concentrated in OECD countries as a sign of technological 
superiority and, in particular, among the initial small group of top eight R&D   8
performer countries. However, the dynamics among groups depict a world where all 
of them intensify the production of high-tech products. 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
  These types of goods are by definition R&D-intensive in R&D-performing 
countries. However, given the transformation in the nature of international trade 
during the last three decades and the fact that many developing economies perform 
labour-intensive fragments of high-tech products in a global production chain, trade 
data do not allow us to distinguish which products have a high R&D content added in 
the exporting economy or simply have an unskilled labour value added. In Figure 2, it 
is clear that this feature is overlooked. A strong positive relationship is shown 
between RCA in technological products and R&D expenditure.
8 The larger a 
country’s investment in R&D, the greater its technological advantage displayed in the 
export pattern.
9 The data clearly show that technological advantage and R&D effort 
are positively related in a cross-section of countries, which suggests that this type of 
product embodies technology that is based on R&D activities at country level. 
However, on the other hand, there are countries with a low level of R&D expenditure 
that apparently reveal a comparative advantage in exporting high-tech products (i.e. 
Mexico, Thailand or Singapore). To overcome this pitfall, those countries with a low 
level of R&D expenditure should be discarded as technological leaders. 
Summing up, our measure of technology trade entails goods that fulfil two 
criteria. On the one hand are those by definition R&D-intensive in developed 
countries and, on the other hand, are those exported by economies that have a 
comparative advantage in those goods.
10   9
IV.  MODEL AND ESTIMATION 
The goal of this study is to estimate the determinants of technology imports. We used 
the following model: 
(2) 
jt t j jt jt v u X M ε β α + + + + = log  
where  M
jt
is per worker technology imports, measured in 1995 constant US dollars
11 
in country j and time t.  X
jt
is a set of macroeconomic and institutional explanatory 




is a fixed country effect,  v
t
 is a set of time dummies and  ε
jt
is an error 
term identically and independently distributed across countries and time.  
Technology is adopted because agents find that expected profits overcome 
expected costs. Although this decision is taken on the demand side, expected costs 
and benefits are affected by the supply side and by the institutional environment. At 
the national level, the demand for technology imports is constrained by an adequate 
supply of complementary inputs, such as human capital. To control for this issue, we 
have introduced several educational variables relating to workforce. On the one hand, 
we constructed an aggregated measure of human capital based on the adult 
population’s years of education, following Hall and Jones (1999).
13 On the other hand, 
we disaggregated human capital at different levels of education according to 
attainment measures calculated by Barro and Lee (2000). There are also relatively 
important potential technology adopters, such as domestic companies, the government 
and multinational companies. Furthermore, some complementary inputs might be 
related to the activity developed by these agents. To control for these factors, we 
included three proxies, domestic investment, government consumption and FDI 
inflows.
14 Certainly, domestic investment is already containing imports of capital and   10
intermediate goods that appear in the left-hand side of the model. To avoid potential 
bias, we remove from investment the amount of technology imports. 
Another set of control variables were introduced to take the institutional and 
policy environment into account. The increasing literature on intellectual property 
rights and trade concludes that a stronger IPR system has two opposite effects 
(Maskus and Penubarti, 1995). On the one hand, there is a positive market expansion 
effect, since companies should be encouraged to export into that market because 
protection reduces the risk of piracy and protects company profitability in that market. 
However, there is a market power effect of negative sign, since stronger IPR 
protection reduces the ability of domestic companies to imitate and this increases the 
market power of the exporter firm, which might lead to reduced sales ex post in that 
market. The final result will depend on the relative importance of market power and 
market expansion. To measure IPR, we introduced an index of patent protection 
ranked from less (0) to more (5) patent protective legal systems as calculated from 
Ginarte and Park (1997).  
On the other hand, endogenous growth theories have found a role for openness 
in technology diffusion that broadens traditional trade welfare gains. According to the 
conventional view, trade yields static gains because exporting the goods a country 
produces more efficiently allows the importation of more of those goods the country 
produces more inefficiently. In other words, exports are what an economy pays for its 
imports. More recent theories bring attention to trade openness as a channel of 
knowledge spillovers. According to this view, more open economies tend to benefit 
more in terms of access to public world knowledge, which might lead to dynamic 
gains from trade. To control for these issues, we introduced exports per worker as a 
measure of trade openness.   11
Finally, there are several factors that affect technology adoption from the 
supply side. Rosenberg (1972) emphasized three factors, such as the novelties 
introduced into technology after creation, the invention of new uses for technology 
and the provision of complementary inputs by technology providers. At country level, 
there are no direct measures of these factors. However, we find that GDP per worker 
or agricultural and industrial shares are certainly related to the existence of a 
complementary technological sector. Our approach is very parsimonious and we do 
not include all these proxies simultaneously, given that the levels of development and 
the sectoral composition of output could either being endogenous or capturing 
possible omitted factors determining technology imports.   
Several  X variables, such as education and the intellectual property rights 
protection index, are not available on a yearly basis. Therefore, a panel with a cross-
section of a maximum of 80 countries, from 1970 to 1995, at five-year intervals was 
used. 
Table 1 displays summary statistics of the variables used in the empirical 
analysis. Each variable is represented as an average for the countries and periods 
studied. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
A major concern would be the potential biases arising from endogeneity in 
several explanatory variables. It is likely that technology imports and domestic 
investment or imports and exports are determined simultaneously because they may 
have similar underlying factors. For instance, economies engaged in technology 
import activities, because they are exploiting their closeness advantage with R&D 
performer countries, will likely show prominent export activities. The same will 
happen if trade is encouraged by a reduction in transportation costs. If those common   12
factors were omitted, estimates would be biased and inconsistent. In our model, those 
factors are accounted for thanks to the inclusion of unobserved country and time 
effects. However, it could be argued that reverse causality might still be causing a 
correlation among these right-hand side variables and the error term. Given that these 
potential endogenous variables are not persistent at five-year intervals,
15 our approach 
to dealing with this potential problem consists of lagging exports and investment 
variables five years. 
A different concern is related to the GDP per worker regressor. It suffers from 
the same problem as the two variables referred to in the previous paragraph. However, 
in addition, the variable is very persistent, which is likely to be due to the presence of 
individual effects that change slowly and that are likely to be omitted. This makes the 
approach of lagging this variable (combined with the inclusion of fixed effects) vain 
and a proper solution to the identification problem requires the use of external 
instruments, as in Busse and Groizard (2008). Since GDP per worker is not purely a 
variable of interest and only a control variable, we have checked the robustness of our 
findings.  
4.1 Results 
Table 2 and Table 3 summarize the basic results derived from the total sample and the 
sample that excludes OECD countries. Each column represents a different 
specification of the model. The first one includes the main set of predictors, the 
second employs an alternative measure of human capital, the third is an extension that 
splits the export variable into manufacturing and non-manufacturing exports, the 
fourth explores the interaction of FDI and IPR and the fifth replaces GDP per worker 
with the sectoral shares to check the stability of previous estimates.    13
Each specification was estimated by fixed effects (FE) and random effects 
(RE) including year time dummies. The dummy coefficients have been omitted due to 
space restrictions. A test of FE versus RE was performed to evaluate the efficiency 
and consistency of the estimators. The Chi-squared statistic and its p-value are 
displayed at the bottom of the table and, as we can see, the RE estimators have been 
discarded in all cases.
16 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
In column 1, human capital was computed, taking into consideration schooling 
years. Four out of eight predictors have a significant effect on technology imports at 
conventional levels: investment, FDI, human capital and human capital squared. All 
the investment variables have the expected positive sign. Meanwhile, the Hall–Jones 
measure of human capital is negatively related to technology imports and its quadratic 
coefficient is positive. The rest of the variables are not significantly different from 
zero. 
Column 2 shows the estimates of the model once an alternative measure of 
human capital is used. We introduce the percentage of labour force with primary 
education attained, an indicator potentially relevant to economies lagging far behind 
the technology frontier. The estimates seem to reproduce the pattern found in the 
previous specification with the only difference being that the IPR coefficient now 
turns out to be significant at the 5 per cent level.
17 
In column 3, total exports are disaggregated into manufacturing and non-
manufacturing exports, while the rest of the variables are the same. The effect of the 
manufacturing exports is negative and significant while the effect of the non-
manufacturing exports is positive but we cannot discard that it is null. The remaining 
variables maintain the same sign and significance.   14
Column 4 explores the interaction of FDI and IPR, to test whether the 
protection of intellectual property reinforces the role of multinational firms as 
enhancers of technology imports. Estimates imply that, although the interaction is not 
significant, the joint IPR effect is positive and significant. The other variables remain 
robust. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
The specification in column 5 uses agriculture and industry sectoral shares 
instead of GDP per worker. Both columns display very similar results in significance 
levels and sign. In addition, the agriculture share is significant and negative while the 
industrial share is positive and significant. On the other hand, government 
consumption is now significant and positive. 
4.2 Robustness 
In addition to changes in the specification and measurement of variables, we 
investigate the robustness of our main findings, limiting the sample to those countries 
that do not reveal a clear comparative advantage in exporting technological goods. It 
is important to recall that, since the production of technology is concentrated in a 
handful of OECD countries and the rest of the world imports R&D-intensive goods 
from the former, imports of those goods are a better proxy for investment in 
technology in economies that do not produce them. The results excluding 21 OECD 
economies are shown in Table 3. First, there is a positive relationship between 
technology imports and investment and the estimation is quantitatively similar to the 
full sample. Second, there is a positive and very significant relationship between FDI 
and technology imports. Third, the more legal protection for intellectual property 
rights, the more technology imports. The FDI interaction is positive and the joint IPR 
effect is significant at the 10 per cent level. Fourth, the role of human capital is very   15
similar: the fraction of workers with primary education has a negative coefficient and 
the quadratic term is positive. Fifth, the role of openness is less robust, and exporting 
manufactured goods reduces imports of technology. Sixth, the larger the government 
expenditure, the higher the imports of technology (which is significant in one out of 
four columns). 
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
To extend the robustness controls, we have performed further checks, 
displayed in Table 4. On the one hand, we have compared the results of two 
specifications across three different samples of countries: the full sample, the sample 
excluding OECD economies and the sample that excludes uniquely the top eight 
technology exporters. On the other hand, we have excluded from the specifications 
the GDP per worker indicator instead of replacing it with other variables. In addition, 
we have explored two simultaneous IPR interactions with FDI and human capital, to 
test whether the market power effect is reduced with the ability to imitate. The results 
tend to confirm the role played by domestic and foreign investments, IPR regime, 
human capital and manufacturing exports in technology imports. Moreover, the global 
effect of IPR is also different from zero in all the samples. It is especially relevant that 
human capital interaction in the developing countries sample is negative. 
4.3 Discussion 
Why do some countries import more technology? According to the literature, a broad 
set of variables has been tested as potential explanations. Rising domestic investment, 
FDI inflows and improving the institutional intellectual property rights (IPR) system 
stimulate technology imports. Meanwhile, increases in schooling or exports of 
manufacturing goods seem to reduce access to embodied foreign technology. The 
estimated elasticity of their respective contributions varies slightly across   16
specifications and samples, but, in general, parameters seem to be stable and robust to 
different checks. 
Economies investing more resources domestically also invest more in foreign 
technology in a range of elasticities from 0.14 to 0.20. An average estimated elasticity 
suggests that increasing domestic investment by 1 per cent results in an increase in 
imports of R&D-intensive goods of 0.17 per cent on average, after five years. This 
variable is basically aimed at capturing the effort of the local economy to provide a 
supply-side stimulus for the adoption of new technology, such as the adequate 
provision of complementary physical capital inputs or expenditure to adapt foreign 
technology to local conditions. This complementarity is weaker in the technologically 
disadvantaged sample, which suggests that developing countries are importing less 
sophisticated technologies requiring less adaptation or less physical capital to be 
employed.  
Multinational companies’ activity captured through FDI inflows increases 
imports of technology. A 1 per cent increase in FDI raises imports of R&D-intensive 
goods by a range of between 0.07 and 0.1 per cent. The magnitude of this elasticity is 
almost half of the contribution of domestic investment to technology imports and is 
very stable across the samples. Given that this variable is underestimating the size of 
multinationals’ activity in the host economy, its contribution seems to be very 
relevant. Investment by multinationals is seen as a direct channel of technology 
transfer in developing countries. This piece of evidence suggests that local firms react 
to adopting foreign embodied technologies as FDI increases. Previous studies have 
documented that foreign direct investment generates spillovers to local competitors. 
For instance, Saggi (2002) shows that Mexico’s maquiladoras that began as 
subsidiaries of US firms adopted more sophisticated imported production techniques   17
over time. In similar case studies, foreign investors helped their local subcontractors 
keep pace with modern technologies (Moran, 1998, 2001).  
 Another  robust  determinant of technology imports is the protection of 
intellectual property rights. Our findings suggest that increasing the level of patent 
right protection may increase technology imports, as suggested by the market 
expansion effect. Comparing both samples, the IPR effect seems to be stronger in the 
developing countries sample. This implies that technology providers are more willing 
to export embodied technology to countries where institutions protect patents and as a 
consequence guarantee appropriability impeding imitation. This empirical finding is 
in line with Maskus and Penubarti (1995) and with Falvey et al. (2006) but is in sharp 
contrast to Fink and Primo-Braga (2005) and Caselli and Wilson (2004), who did not 
find the market expansion effect to exist in R&D-type goods.  
Furthermore, there is some evidence that IPRs interact positively with FDI in 
technology imports. This implies that the global effect of FDI is even higher for 
countries protecting the intellectual property more. This effect could be especially 
r e l e v a n t  w h e n  M N E s  t r a n s f er technology thanks to the existence of contracts 
(licensing). If the legal institutions do not impede copying, MNEs reduce licensing or 
might transfer lagging technologies (Maskus, 2000). On the other hand, there is a 
negative interaction between IPRs and human capital indicators, as suggested by the 
literature. The market power that brings IPRs to technology exporters in that market is 
in fact reduced thanks to the ability of local agents to imitate foreign technologies. 
 When  computing  the  effect of human capital, the elasticities are negative using 
measures based on either schooling years or attainment levels.
18 The quadratic term is 
positive, which means that increases in education are attenuating the negative effect of 
human capital. This implies that economies having higher levels of education tend to   18
depend less on imported technologies and more on domestically produced 
technologies. A possible interpretation is that unskilled workers and technological 
goods are substitutes, an idea that is consistent with the international skill-biased 
technological progress evidenced by Berman and Machin (2000) and Gancia and 
Epifani (2008). 
Finally, there is not a robust link between exports and technology imports, 
although, when disaggregating between manufacturing and non-manufacturing 
exports, results show that manufacturing exports restrict technology imports in the full 
sample. Meanwhile, moving towards the developing country sample, the relationship 
almost disappears. This suggests that results are mainly driven by the presence of 
advanced countries in the sample. A possible explanation is that exporting 
manufactured goods is somehow correlated with the ability to produce high-tech 
domestically and then being less dependent on technology imports. We do not observe 
a clear role for trade openness as Caselli and Coleman (2001) found for the case of 
imports of computers. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In this study, we provide evidence on why some countries import more technology 
than others in a cross-section of 80 countries between 1970 and 1995. Technology 
imports have been measured in terms of R&D-intensive goods imports exported by 
top R&D-performing countries and can be conceived as a proxy for investment in 
embodied technologies, especially in developing countries.  
The findings suggest that countries can increase imports of technology through 
raising domestic and foreign investment and improving the IPR system. However, 
economies tend to substitute imports of foreign technology by increasing the number   19
of non-skilled individuals in the workforce. We also find that FDI’s role in technology 
imports is reinforced when countries improve the intellectual property rights regime 
and that the market power that guarantees the IPR system to technology proprietors is 
reduced as long as the ability to imitate rises. 
Governments in laggard economies can improve the absorptive capacity in 
order to maximize the transfer of technology from abroad and to narrow the gap with 
the leaders. Creating a sound investment climate, attracting foreign investment or 
improving the IPR regime seem to favour adequate conditions to catch up. Previous 
evidence has found a role for FDI in favouring technology transfer through training of 
the workforce, licensing or creating backward and forward linkages with local firms. 
The evidence presented in this paper suggests that FDI also increases imports of 
R&D-intensive goods, and this effect is likely to take place as a spillover effect rather 
than a direct acquisition of intermediate or capital goods. Moreover, the gains of FDI 
are even larger when IPRs are better protected. 
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1   For instance, Eaton and Kortum (2001) find that a country’s level of human capital (measured 
by average years of schooling) is associated with lower trade barriers, and that once human capital is 
accounted for, tariff barriers remain an insignificant trade cost parameter. 
2   Existing data matching production and trade data cover a shorter period of time (1980–1997) 
and are restricted to a smaller number of countries. See Caselli and Wilson (2004) for an explanation. 
3     In Busse and Groizard (2008), the causal effect of technology imports on GDP per worker is 
analysed using external instruments. The results conclude that this type of trade explains a large share 
of cross-country productivity differences. Moreover, the authors elaborate a framework to isolate the 
technology imports’ effect from other trade effects on productivity growth. 
4    This taxonomy is based on Pavitt (1984). In Appendix A, the reader can find a brief 
description of the capital and intermediate goods selected according to R&D intensity. 
5    Technology trade data are extracted from the COMTRADE database (UNCTAD). 
6   Eaton and Kortum (2001) found similar trade patterns comparing more recent production data 
of capital goods. 
7   The data for OECD are an average that includes the top eight R&D performer countries; when 
we exclude them the gap is also magnified. We plotted the OECD average, since the aim of this 
exercise was to compare technology gaps between developing economies and technological leaders and 
not between technological leaders. 
8    R&D expenditure data are from OECD (2001). 
9   Thailand and Mexico are clear outliers, since neither of these economies would be expected to 
show a technological advantage in the RCA index, due to their low level of R&D expenditure. 
However, they still have an RCA index greater than one due to the fact that they are importers and 
assemblers of technological components. 
10    To technological exporters we also apply two criteria: having an index of RCA larger than 
one and being a larger R&D performer. 
11    The variable has been deflated using the investment deflator in the USA. Given that the model 
takes into account individual and time effects, deflating the dependent variable by the US investment 
deflator yields exactly the same results as employing the nominal measure. 
12    All the variables used and their sources are described in Appendix B. 
13   Hall and Jones (1999) measured human capital by imposing a discontinuous linear function of 
schooling years per worker: for the first four years, return to schooling is 13.4 per cent, for the next 
four years of education assume a rate of 10.1 per cent and beyond the eighth year the value is 6.8 per 
cent. 
14   Government consumption is expressed as a share of GDP; investment is measured in per 
worker terms and constant 1995 US dollars.  
15      AR(1) coefficients (standard errors in parenthesis) using fixed effects are the following: 
investment per worker 0.1707 (0.0439), total exports per worker 0.1455 (0.0304), manufacturing 
exports per worker 0.1049 (0.0358) and non-manufacturing exports per worker 0.1474 (0.0352). 21
                                                                                                                                            
16   The Sargan–Hansen test is a test of overidentifying restrictions that is designed to generate 
non-negative test statistics. See Arellano (1993) for a precise explanation. 
17     The Hall–Jones measure of human capital is a weighted average of schooling years where the 
weights given to the first years are higher since evidence suggests that returns to primary education are 
higher that the rest. However, our results also show that primary education plays a negative role in 
technology imports. It could be argued that an unweighted measure of human capital would change the 
sign of the estimation. However, we have regressed specifications in Table 2 using total years of 
schooling instead and the signs do not change. 
18     We have also employed a battery of indicators of human capital, such as the fraction of the 
workforce with primary, secondary and tertiary education either individually or simultaneously. The 
results show that primary attainment is the only significant variable, while higher levels of attainment 
although positive are not significantly different from zero and their exclusion does not alter other 
variable coefficients.   22
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APPENDIX A: DEFINITION OF TECHNOLOGY GOODS 
Product category  STIC No. (Rev. 1) 
Medicine and various chemical products  541, 553 
Machinery and power engines, excl. internal combustion engines  7111-7118 
Specialized machinery, excl. paper and food machinery processing  722, 7231, 7249, 726, 729, 734 
Instruments and various manufactured goods  861, 862, 864 
Other technology products  9510 
Source: Own definition based on ECLAC (2002). 
 
APPENDIX B: DEFINITION OF VARIABLES AND DATA SOURCES 
Variable Definition  Source 
GDP  Gross domestic product per worker, measured at international 
constant 1996 US dollars 
Penn World Table 
Mark 6.1, updated 
version of Summers 
and Heston (1991) 
Technology 
imports (M) 
Technology imports (1995 US dollars) divided by labour force  UNCTAD (2005) and 
World Bank (2005) 
IPR  Intellectual property rights protection index, 0 and 5  Ginarte and Park 
(1995) 
Total exports  Total exports of goods and services (current US dollars) divided by 
labour force 
Easterly and Sewadeh 




Exports of manufacturing goods (current US dollars) divided by 
labour force 
Easterly and Sewadeh 





Exports of non-manufacturing goods (current US dollars) divided 
by labour force 
Easterly and Sewadeh 





Discontinuous linear function of schooling years per worker   Hall and Jones (1999) 
Investment  Domestic investment net of technology import (1995 US dollars) 
divided by labour force 




Foreign direct investment divided by labour force  World Bank (2005) 
Government 
consumption 
Government consumption divided by GDP, per cent  World Bank (2005) 
Primary 
education 
Population with primary education attained and no more, per cent  Barro and Lee (2000) 
Agriculture 
share 
Agriculture output divided by GDP, per cent  World Bank (2005) 
Industry share  Industrial output divided by GDP, per cent  World Bank (2005)   27
 
APPENDIX C: COUNTRY SAMPLE 
Algeria; Argentina; Australia;* Austria;* Bangladesh; Belgium;* Benin; Bolivia; Brazil; Cameroon; 
Canada;* Chile; Colombia; Congo, Dem. Rep.; Congo, Rep.; Costa Rica; Denmark;* Dominican 
Republic; Ecuador; Egypt, Arab Rep.; El Salvador; Fiji; Finland;* France;* Ghana; Greece;* Guatemala; 
Guyana; Haiti; Honduras; Iceland;* India; Indonesia; Iran, Islamic Rep.; Ireland;* Israel; Italy;* Jamaica; 
Japan;* Jordan; Kenya; Korea, Rep.; Malawi; Malaysia; Mali; Mauritius; Mexico; Netherlands;* 
Nicaragua; Niger;  Nepal; New Zealand;* Norway;* Pakistan; Panama; Papua New Guinea; Paraguay;  
Peru; Portugal;* Senegal; Sierra Leone; Singapore; South Africa; Spain;* Sri Lanka; Sweden;* 
Switzerland;* Syrian Arab Republic; Thailand; Togo; Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia; Turkey; United 
Kingdom;* United States;* Uruguay; Venezuela; Zambia; and Zimbabwe. 
Note: * denotes OECD countries.   28















Figure 2: Technology advantage and R&D effort, 1995
RCA
R&D expenditure (% of GDP)






















































Table 1: Summary statistics 
Variable  Obs. Mean  Std.  Dev. Min.  Max. 
        
Log of technology imports per worker  322 4.49 1.52 0.29  8.11 
Log of GDP per worker  322 9.04 0.96 6.74  10.53 
Log of investment per worker  319 7.21 1.50 3.74  10.03 
Government consumption (% GDP)  322 15.01 5.97 3.14  43.41 
Intellectual property rights  322 2.55 0.92 0.00  4.86 
Agricultural share (% GDP)  289 17.77 13.12 0.17  64.88 
Industrial share (% GDP)  288 29.96 8.96 6.94  60.64 
Log of FDI per worker  322 3.40 2.22 -3.88  8.32 
Log of human capital (Hall–Jones index)  322 0.62 0.30 0.00  1.22 
Primary education  320 30.85 13.78 1.80  67.50 
Log of exports per worker  320 7.00 1.76 2.19  11.42 
Log of manuf. exports per worker  320 5.16 2.55 -1.30  10.94 
Log of non-manuf. exports per worker  319 6.61 1.61 1.53  10.44 
Note: All variables refer to country averages for the period considered. Variables are defined in the 
text.   30
 
Table 2: Results in full sample 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Constant  3.870 3.669 2.771  2.859  1.737 
 [1.292]*** [1.177]*** [1.240]**  [1.232]**  [0.676]** 
Log investment per worker  0.168  0.162  0.194  0.197  0.148 
 [0.086]*  [0.083]*  [0.084]**  [0.082]**  [0.068]** 
Government consumption (% GDP)  0.019  0.021  0.018  0.019  0.035 
 [0.014]  [0.015]  [0.014]  [0.014]  [0.013]***
Intellectual property rights protection index  0.140  0.194  0.165  0.090  0.210 
  [0.091] [0.089]**  [0.088]* [0.118]  [0.088]** 
Log FDI per worker  0.081  0.086  0.092  0.045  0.069 
 [0.020]*** [0.021]*** [0.021]*** [0.059]  [0.021]***
Log of human capital  -2.267    -2.205  -1.901  -2.297 
  [0.946]**  [0.982]**  [1.080]*  [1.082]** 
Log of human capital squared  1.507    1.363  1.094  1.674 
  [0.595]**  [0.651]**  [0.742]  [0.768]** 
Log exports per worker  0.086  0.114       
 [0.112]  [0.112]       
Primary  education   -0.035      
   [0.016]**      
Primary education squared    0.000       
   [0.000]*       
Log manuf. exports per worker      -0.074  -0.073  -0.086 
     [0.037]**  [0.038]*  [0.030]***
Log non-manuf. exports per worker      0.161  0.151  0.139 
     [0.102]  [0.102]  [0.087] 
IPR  ×  FDI      0.019   
      [0.021]   
Agricultural share (% GDP)          -0.017 
        [ 0 . 0 0 9 ] *  
Industrial share (% GDP)          0.018 
        [ 0 . 0 0 9 ] *  
Observations 321  319  320  320  287 
Number of countries  80  80  79  79  75 
R-squared  0.47 0.47 0.49  0.49  0.53 
Lagged GDP per worker included?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
Global IPR effect is null (F-test)        3.2   
p-value      0.077   
Sargan–Hansen statistic (χ
2)  79.461 107.559 65.727 68.057 47.325 
p-value  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. Significance levels: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%. The dependent variable is the log of technology imports per worker. The following 
variables are lagged five years (logs of): GDP per worker, investment per worker, total exports per worker, 
manufacturing exports per worker and non-manufacturing exports per worker. All the specifications are 
estimated using the fixed effect estimator and include a set of time dummy variables omitted for space 
reasons.  
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Table 3: Results excluding OECD countries 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Constant 3.741  2.619  2.693  1.200 
 [1.173]*** [1.124]**  [1.122]** [0.563]** 
Log investment per worker  0.150  0.178  0.181  0.140 
 [0.085]*  [0.083]**  [0.082]** [0.066]** 
Government consumption (% GDP)  0.017  0.017  0.018  0.035 
 [0.016]  [0.016]  [0.016]  [0.013]*** 
Intellectual property rights protection index  0.173  0.197  0.151  0.284 
 [0.107]  [0.103]*  [0.146]  [0.101]*** 
Log FDI per worker  0.088  0.098  0.069  0.071 
 [0.022]*** [0.023]*** [0.063]  [0.022]*** 
Primary education  -0.041  -0.042  -0.041  -0.034 
 [0.019]**  [0.020]**  [0.020]** [0.017]* 
Primary education squared  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.000 
 [0.000]**  [0.000]**  [0.000]** [0.000]* 
Log exports per worker  0.113       
 [0.114]       
Log manuf. exports per worker    -0.055  -0.055  -0.076 
   [0.037]  [0.037]  [0.028]** 
Log non-manuf. exports per worker    0.141  0.138  0.113 
   [0.098]  [0.098]  [0.082] 
IPR × FDI      0.012   
     [0.024]   
Agricultural share (% GDP)        -0.014 
       [0.008]* 
Industrial share (% GDP)        0.026 
       [0.009]*** 
Observations 237  236  236  225 
Number of countries  59  58  58  57 
R-squared 0.43  0.44  0.44  0.53 
Lagged GDP per worker included?  Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
Global IPR effect is null (F-test)      2.97   
p-value     0.090   
Sargan–Hansen statistic (χ
2)  88.438  71.057 75.217 57.279 
p-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. Significance levels: * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The dependent variable is the log of technology 
imports per worker. The following variables are lagged five years (logs of): GDP per worker, 
investment per worker, total exports per worker, manufacturing exports per worker and non-
manufacturing exports per worker. All the specifications are estimated using the fixed effect 
estimator and include a set of time dummy variables omitted for space reasons.  
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Table 4: Robustness 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 





Constant 2.103  2.020  1.860  1.097  1.782  1.553 
 [0.610]*** [0.809]** [0.495]*** [0.724]  [0.507]***  [0.693]**
Log investment per worker  0.158  0.166  0.138  0.138  0.145  0.147 
 [0.070]**  [0.070]** [0.069]*  [0.065]**  [0.066]**  [0.064]**
Government consumption (% GDP)  0.018  0.019  0.017  0.016  0.022  0.022 
 [0.013]  [0.013]  [0.016]  [0.015]  [0.015]  [0.015] 
Intellectual property rights   0.171  0.185  0.207  0.578  0.237  0.352 
protection index  [0.089]*  [0.285]  [0.102]**  [0.272]**  [0.095]**  [0.235] 
Log FDI per worker  0.092  0.033  0.098  0.050  0.100  0.014 
 [0.020]*** [0.050]  [0.023]*** [0.063]  [0.023]***  [0.052] 
Log of human capital  -2.236  -1.724  -0.042  -0.015  -0.039  -0.022 
  [0.983]** [1.014]* [0.020]**  [0.021]  [0.018]**  [0.018] 
Log of human capital squared  1.363  1.247  0.001  0.001  0.000  0.001 
 [0.649]**  [0.918]  [0.000]**  [0.000]***  [0.000]*  [0.000]**
Log manuf. exports per worker  -0.081  -0.083  -0.062  -0.066  -0.077  -0.074 
 [0.034]**  [0.038]** [0.033]*  [0.035]*  [0.033]**  [0.034]**
Log non-manuf. exports per worker  0.136  0.129  0.112  0.120  0.147  0.136 
  [0.087] [0.088] [0.085]  [0.083] [0.084]*  [0.084] 
IPR  ×  FDI    0.024   0.020   0.034 
    [0.019]   [0.025]   [0.020]* 
IPR × human capital    -0.150    -0.014    -0.008 
   [0.369]  [0.007]*  [0.006] 
Observations  321 321 237  237  285 285 
Number of countries  80  80  59  59  73  73 
R-squared  0.49  0.49  0.44 0.46 0.47  0.48 
Lagged GDP per worker included?  No  No  No  No  No  No 
Global IPR effect is null (F-test)    3.18    6.18    6.14 
p-value    0.078   0.016   0.016 
Sargan–Hansen statistic (χ
2) 60.769  61.151  63.480  87.587  75.011  83.370 
p-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. Significance levels: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. The dependent variable is the log of technology imports per worker. The following variables 
are lagged five years (logs of): GDP per worker, investment per worker, total exports per worker, 
manufacturing exports per worker and non-manufacturing exports per worker. All the specifications are 
estimated using the fixed effect estimator and include a set of time dummy variables omitted for space reasons. 
 